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Interest Rate Pass-through in Sri Lanka
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Abstract
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has increasingly been relying on interest rates
as the instrument for conducting monetary policy. Changes to the key monetary
policy variables, the Repo and the Reverse Repo rates, are initially expected to be
reflected in the OMO rates and the call money market rates, before being passed-
through to commercial bank retail interest rates. It is important to obtain a good
understanding of the speed and magnitude of the interest rate pass-through to
make timely monetary policy decisions in order to meet the objective of economic
and price stability. This paper examines the size and speed of the pass-through
from policy interest rates to call money market rates and from call money market
rates to commercial bank retail interest rates. The paper concludes that the CBSL
policy decisions are efficiently transmitted to the short end of the money market
within a matter of days. Also, the pass-through from policy interest rates to the call
money market rate is almost complete. However, the pass-through from call money
market rates to both lending rates and deposit interest rates of commercial banks
is sluggish and incomplete. The only exception is, perhaps, the rates on lending to
prime customers, which show a faster and a fuller pass-through. Also, there is no
evidence of an asymmetry of pass-through over different phases of the interest rate
cycle. (JEL E43, E52)
I. Introduction
During the Past few decades, interest rate has become the most important policy instrument
used by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) in its monetary operations. The CBSL has
gradually moved away from non-market oriented policy instruments to the use of policy
interest rates as a market oriented framework in the conduct of the country’s monetary
policy. This has been an evolutionary process where the CBSL introduced the Repurchase
(Repo) facility in October 1993, Reverse Repurchase (Reverse Repo) facility in November
1998 and more active open market operations (OMO) in March 2003.
Interest rate is a key channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, through
which a central bank attempts to influence the short-term money market interest rates, and
1/ The author wishes to thank Prof. William Branson, Dr H.N.Thenuwara, Mr. S. Lankatilleke, Mr. B.D.W.A. Silva, Mrs.
S.Gunaratne for their valuable comments and guidance and Mrs. Shravika Damunupola for editorial assistance. The
views expressed in this paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Central Bank of Sri
Lanka.
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thereby the commercial bank lending and deposit rates, in order to curtail inflationary pres-
sures while providing adequate lubrication for economic growth. The success of the interest
rate channel in conducting monetary policy operations primarily depends on the speed of
adjustment of market interest rates and the degree of pass-through. A quicker and fuller
pass-through of policy rates and market interest rates to retail bank interest rates strength-
ens monetary policy transmission.
Researchers have observed that interest rate pass-through is often not an immediate
adjustment and usually not a one-for-one change. Therefore, with the market orientation of
the conduct of monetary policy in Sri Lanka, with policy interest rates as the key monetary
policy instrument, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the interest rate pass-
through process. A clear perception of this process could be quite important for the timing of
monetary policy action.
The aim of the present study is to address three issues relating to the interest rate pass-
through process in Sri Lanka. These are as follows:
1. Is there a one-to-one pass-through from policy interest rates to call money market
rates or else, at what rate does a unit change in policy rates impact upon the call
money market rates in the short-run and in the long-run?
2. Is there a one-to-one pass-through from call money market rates to commercial
bank retail interest rates (lending rates / deposit rates) or else, at what rate does a
unit change in call money market rates impact upon the commercial bank retail
interest rates in the short-run and in the long-run?
3. Is there an asymmetry of pass-through during different phases of an interest rate
cycle? In other words, is the pass-through of rising interest rates significantly
different from the pass-through of falling interest rates?
In order to analyse these issues, this paper is organised as follows: The rest of this
chapter explains the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and in particular, the interest
rate channel of monetary policy transmission. It will also introduce the concepts of interest
rate pass-through and interest rate stickiness and provide a brief background of the use of
interest rates as a key instrument in the conduct of monetary policy in Sri Lanka. Section II
will review the existing literature on the subject and discuss the nature of the pass-through
in other countries as measured by other researchers. Deriving from the research methodolo-
gies adopted by international researchers, section III will discuss the data and statistical and
econometric tools used in this study while in section IV data are analysed and the findings
of the analyses are outlined. Section V will wrap up the discussion on the interest rate pass-
through.
A. Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission and Transmission Lag
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy is defined as how changes to the monetary
policy instruments of a central bank affect changes in price levels and output of a country.
This is a process that works through several economic and financial variables in an economy.
Economists often refer to five channels of monetary policy transmission, which are usually
interrelated. These channels are
a) Interest rate channel,
b) Exchange rate channel,
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c) Other asset effect channel,
d) Credit channel, and
e)  Expectations.
 
Figure 1: Channels of Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
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The interest rate channel is the traditional monetary policy transmission channel as
explained by Keynesians. Under this channel, monetary expansion along with associated
decline in interest rates, lower the cost of borrowing for firms and consumers leading to
increased investment and consumption. This increases aggregate demand and output gap
leading to increasing prices and inflation.
The exchange rate channel can work through either net exports or import prices. In-
creased money supply lowers the interest rate leading to a depreciation of the exchange rate.
This increases competitiveness improving the trade balance as well as generating higher
demand. The depreciation of the exchange rate also raises import prices, which directly affect
the price level, thus creating inflation.
The asset price channel has two channels involving Tobin’s q theory of investment and
wealth effects on consumption. Lower interest rates increase the present value of future
income flows and therefore asset prices. This raises wealth, which will affect demand. In-
creased wealth may also increase bank lending by reducing problems related to asymmetric
information between banks and firms.
The credit channel is of two types, i.e., bank lending and balance sheet channels. Bank
lending is important for small firms and consumers who cannot raise their own funds. Bal-
ance sheet channel is based on the principle that healthier balance sheets lead to freer
borrowing conditions.
Expectations about the future stance of monetary policy are also important as a trans-
mission channel. If economic agents believe that the current policy is inappropriate, it leads
to creating expectations about future actions of the central bank. Inflation expectations also
matter in shaping the monetary transmission mechanism.
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There is neither an agreement among economists on the existence of the five channels
mentioned above nor with regard to the importance of these monetary policy transmission
channels. This is because the importance of each channel differs from economy to economy,
from time to time and under different circumstances. Not only the importance but also the
speed and the size of the effect of each channel are not constant. However, if monetary
policy actions are to become successful, a central bank needs to have a proper assessment
of the working of the monetary policy transmission mechanism through various channels of
an economy. As Mishkin (1996) emphasized, “[a]n understanding of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism is essential to understand what monetary policy can and should do
and at what point in time, actions should be undertaken to contain or offset disturbances
that could threaten the achievement of the targets.”
Changes to monetary policy variables do not transmit to other economic variables
instantaneously. On the contrary, it has been demonstrated that the effects of monetary
policy work are felt on the final targets after long and variable lags. Figure 2 explains the lags
in monetary policy transmission as shown by Vaish (2000).
The inside lag is the time lag within the central bank between the time when action is
needed and the time when action is practically implemented. The intermediate lag is known to
be the lag between the time when the central bank takes action and the time when a sufficient
effect on interest rates and other credit conditions to influence the spending decisions of
economic agents significantly. The outside lag is the lag between the time when changes in
interest rates and other credit conditions occur and the time when the initial impact of these
changes is reflected in price levels and output of the economy.
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Figure 2: Lags in Monetary Policy Transmission 
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Modelling the entire monetary policy transmission mechanism is an enormous task.
Therefore, the focus of this paper is limited to analysing the initial stages of the interest rate
channel of the monetary transmission mechanism. Within this framework, emphasis is made
on the intermediate lag where monetary policy action is transmitted to the retail market
interest rates.
B. Interest Rate channel, Pass-through and Stickiness
The interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission has a long history which goes
back to the times of Keynes. Initially, this channel was considered to be affecting price levels
and output through firms’ business decisions on investment decisions, but later the scope
has been broadened to capture consumer decisions on expenditure on housing and con-
sumer durables as well. According to Mishkin (1996), the emphasis of the interest rate
channel is on the real rather than the nominal interest rate and often on the real long-term
interest rate and not the short term interest rate, “since it is the real long term interest rate that
is viewed as having the major impact on spending”. Although some economists, such as
Bernanke have shown that the existence of a separate interest rate channel has been under-
mined by the fact that there is a stronger credit channel, some others such as Taylor (1995)
have indicated that there is strong evidence to establish the existence of a strong interest
rate channel working through consumption and investment.
With increased reputation of policy interest rates as the main monetary policy instru-
ment in many economies, it is essential that a central bank make required adjustments to its
policy interest rate at present in order to achieve monetary policy objectives in the future.
Movements of the policy interest rates are expected to influence the entire term structure of
market interest rates, although in practice, it has been observed that while short-term market
interest rates adjust more closely with the changes to the policy interest rates, the impact on
long term rates depends on inflation expectations following the adjustments in the policy
rates.
Most literature on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy implicitly assumes
that once a central bank’s policy rate is changed, short-term market and retail banking rates
will follow suit, i.e., that there will be immediate and complete “pass-through” to commercial
bank rates. Interest rate pass-through is generally defined as the extent to which changes in
central bank policy interest rates and/or money market interest rates are reflected in changes
in commercial bank retail interest rates, both in the short-run and the long-run. A full pass-
through is said to take place when a movement in the policy interest rates/money market
interest rates leads to a one-for-one change in commercial bank interest rates.
If the pass-through to bank interest rates demonstrates “stickiness”, i.e., pass-through
is sluggish and incomplete, the channels of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
that operate through bank rates will also be affected. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) have
shown that the term “interest rate stickiness” has usually taken two distinct meanings.
“First, it has been used to indicate that bank rates are relatively inelastic with respect to
shifts in the demand for bank loans and deposits. Second, it has been used to indicate that,
in the presence of a change of money market rates, bank rates change by a smaller amount in
the short-run (short-run stickiness), and possible also in the long-run (long-run stickiness).”
It is in the latter context the term “stickiness” is used in this paper.
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C. Interest Rate as a Policy Instrument in Sri Lanka
The Monetary Law Act No. 58 of 1949 has provided the CBSL an array of policy instruments
which could be used in the conduct of monetary policy in Sri Lanka. These vary from market
oriented policy instruments to non market oriented instruments and include the statutory
reserve ratio (SRR) on commercial bank deposit liabilities,  Bank rate, OMO, foreign exchange
operations, refinance facilities, quantitative restrictions on credit, and ceilings on interest
rates.
However, along with international trends in central banking, Sri Lanka too has wit-
nessed a continuous shift from non market oriented policy instruments to market oriented
ones. In this regard, the CBSL has increasingly been relying on interest rates as the instru-
ment for conducting monetary policy in Sri Lanka.
The Central Bank’s key monetary policy interest rates are the Repo rate, the Reverse
Repo rate, and the Bank rate. The first two are closely linked to market rates, while the latter
is more or less a non-market oriented indicative rate. The Repo rate is the rate at which
commercial banks and primary dealers can invest their surplus funds in Government securi-
ties and Central Bank securities held by the CBSL, while the Reverse Repo rate is the rate at
which commercial banks and primary dealers can obtain funds from the Central Bank by
pledging their own holdings of Government securities to the Central Bank. The Bank rate is
defined as the rate at which the Central Bank grants advances to commercial banks to meet
their temporary liquidity requirements as the lender of last resort, but this rate has not been
used since 1985.
The Repo and the Reverse Repo rate are expected to facilitate reducing excess volatility
in the inter-bank overnight money market thereby providing stability to the money market.
Meanwhile changes to these policy interest rates are the Central Bank’s signaling mecha-
nism to indicate the expected direction of interest rates in the market. With the adoption of
the free floating exchange rate regime in January 2001, the CBSL has been allowed more
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freedom in using policy interest rates as the key monetary policy instrument in Sri Lanka.
Figure 3 shows the behaviour of daily interest rates between December 1996 and February
2003 and highlights how interest rates in the call money market have stabilized following the
floating of the exchange rate in early 2001.
Marking a major change in the manner in which the CBSL implements its monetary
policy, the Bank switched to a more market based active open market operations (active
OMO) framework with effects from 03 March 2003. Under this system, the Repo and the
Reverse Repo rates form the corridor in which the overnight market operates, while partici-
pants in the money market are expected to play a more active role in setting the operational
interest rate within the policy interest rate corridor. The weighted average rate at the daily
auctions suggests that there is adequate liquidity in the money market if the rate is close to
the Repo rate, while suggesting the existence of liquidity shortages if the rate is close to the
Reverse Repo rate. Standing facilities are available to participants either at the Repo rate or
Reverse Repo rate, depending on their liquidity conditions. Figure 4 shows the behaviour of
the daily overnight money market interest rates since 03 March 2003 up to 31 December 2004.
By influencing money market interest rate at the short end of the market, the CBSL
expects the interest rate adjustments to be reflected in commercial bank retail interest rates.
Commercial bank prime lending rates and other lending rates as well as commercial bank
deposit rates both on savings as well as term deposits are also expected to adjust. Figure 5
plots the behaviour of some commercial bank deposit and lending rates against the call
money market rate between the period from June 1990 to December 2004.
In summary, changes to the key monetary policy variables, the Repo and the Reverse
Repo rates, are initially expected to be reflected in the OMO rates and the call money market
rates. This initial transmission from the policy interest rates to overnight money market rates
is shaped by the efficiency of the financial market as well as the liquidity conditions of the
money market. While a speedy and complete pass-through indicates the existence of an
efficient money market, sluggish and imperfect adjustments indicate inefficiencies. Also,
STAFF STUDIES - VOLUME 35, NUMBERS 1 & 2
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA8
resultant adjustments in retail lending and deposit rates of commercial banks are good
indicators of the efficiency of the banking and financial system. Since all these factors affect
the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanism of the CBSL it is essential that a good
understanding of this interest rate pass-through process is obtained so that timely monetary
policy decisions could be made to meet the objective of economic and price stability.
II. Literature Review
Given the importance of the interest rate pass-through process to the conduct of monetary
policy, several researchers have ventured to measure its speed and magnitude using time-
series, cross sectional and panel data. Early models included analysing price rigidities under
oligopolistic market models, while there has been a series of recent literature on interest rate
pass-through processes of several economies using autoregressive distributed lag models,
structural vector auto-regression models and error correction models. In this section, an
attempt is made to review several of landmark research work on the subject. A summary of
data and models used by these researchers is provided at the end of this chapter.
An early work on price rigidities in the banking industry could be found in Hannan and
Berger (1991). They focused on the setting of deposit interest rates by banks and addressed
the issue of asymmetry between upward and downward price changes using a multinomial
logit estimation procedure. Their primary findings were that price rigidity is significantly
greater in markets characterised by higher levels of concentration and that deposit rates are
significantly more rigid when the stimulus for a change is upward rather than downward.
Lowe and Rohling (1992) summarized four theoretical explanations in addition to
oligopolistic behaviour for loan rate stickiness. These theories are based on equilibrium
credit rationing, switching costs, implicit risk sharing, and consumer irrationality. They also
examined the degree of stickiness of Australian lending rates, and observed that there are
significant differences in the degree of interest rate stickiness among different rates, even
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after allowing for lags in adjustment. Lowe and Rohling concluded that although it is not
possible to empirically discriminate between the different theories of loan rate stickiness,
their results provide strong evidence for the switching cost explanation.
Research work by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) has provided the bases for several
subsequent works by other researchers on interest rate stickiness. Cottarelli and Kourelis
analysed the degree of lending rate stickiness in 31 industrial and developing countries by
estimating simple dynamic models in order to provide a systematic measure of the different
degree of lending rate stickiness across countries. They regressed the lending rate in each
country against lagged values of money market and discount rates and measured the degree
of lending rate stickiness by looking at the response of lending rates following a change in
money market rates at different time lags by estimating impact, interim and long term multipli-
ers. Cottarelli and Kourelis attributed the different degree of lending rate stickiness to struc-
tural features of the financial system, such as the existence of barriers to competition, the
degree of development of financial markets, and the ownership structure of the banking
system.
Borio and Fritz (1995) examined the relationship between the monetary policy rate,
money market rate and the lending rate for a group of OECD countries. They observed that,
in the short-run, some countries show a high degree of pass-through, while some others
show a high degree of interest rate stickiness. However, in the long-run, the pass-through is
more homogenous across countries and it gets closer to 1. They also found that changes in
money market rates takes three months and two years to be completely transmitted to retail
interest rates.
In 1999, Moazzami examined the short-run and long-run impacts of changes in money
market rates on lending in Canada and the United States using an error-correction modeling
framework, which distinguishes short term impacts from long-run or full equilibrium effects.
Moazzami also specified an autoregressive distributed lag model to allow for the presence of
lags in the adjustment of lending rates to changes in the money market rates
Winker (1999) combined model with credit rationing due to asymmetric information with
a marginal cost pricing to bank behaviour to explain the adjustment of deposit and loan rates
to changes of the money market rate. It was observed that the hypothesis that deposit and
loan rates do not adapt immediately to changes in the money market rate cannot be rejected
based on German monthly data.
Measuring the pass-through for several bank credit and deposit rates for each of the six
largest countries in the euro area, Mojon (2000) assumed that there is full pass-through in the
long-run and concentrated on estimating its size in the short term. His main findings were
that retail rates respond sluggishly to changes in the money market rate, short-term rates
generally respond faster than long-term rates, and there is asymmetry in the degree of pass-
through, in particular, the pass-through to lending rates is larger when the money market rate
increases than when it decreases, while the opposite is true for the deposit rates. Mojon
showed that for both credit and deposit rates, the higher the volatility of the money market
rate the lower the pass-through. Higher competition from other sources of finance or alterna-
tive forms of investment increases the pass-through from the money market rate to bank
rates. According to Mojon, competition also reduces the banks’ ability to smooth their
interest rate margin across the interest rate cycle, thereby reducing the interest rate cycle
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asymmetry of the pass-through.
Toolsema, Strum and de Haan (2001) examined how the pass-through of monetary policy
measures in six EMU countries has evolved over time and whether there is convergence in
monetary transmission. In doing so, they built up on Cottarelli and Kourelis model and
concluded that major differences in pass-through exist between these countries, both in
terms of initial as well as long-run responses to policy induced interest rate changes. They
found no indication for convergence of monetary policy transmission among the six coun-
tries.
In 2001, Donnay and Degryse investigated the pass-through from the money market
rate to several bank lending rates and the government bond rates for twelve European
countries. They applied SVAR based on the Cholesky decomposition in conducting their
analysis.
Heinemann and Schüler (2001) argued that national differences of the pass-through
speed in the EU could be regarded as a retail-oriented indicator of financial integration. The
speed of interest rate adjustments in the EU retail credit markets for different markets and
countries is measured and results showed a considerable fragmentation of markets. They
used simulations to show how much consumers in some countries could gain from a conver-
gence of adjustment speed on the faster levels.
In 2002, Bredin, Fitzpatrick and O Reilly examined the extent to which changes in the
money market interest rate are passed-through to a number of retail lending rates in Ireland.
They also analysed the speed of adjustment of these lending rates with respect to changes
in the money market rate. They found that there is no complete pass-through from the money
market rate to lending rates and the speed of adjustment varies quite considerably across
alternative lending rates. They also showed that there has been significant structural change
in the relationship between the Irish money market rate and lending rates both in terms of
pass-through and speed of adjustment over time.
Using evidence from the Chilean banking industry, Berstein and Fuentes concluded
that there is some sluggishness of adjustments of the bank-lending rates to changes in
policy rate. By using data at the bank level, they explored factors that influence the degree of
delay in market interest rate responses to changes in the policy rate, and found that the size
of the bank, type of customers and the loan risk level are important characteristics that
determine the speed and size of the pass-through.
Weth (2002) analysed the relationships between German bank lending rates and both
money market and capital market rates in the 1990s. This study revealed evidence of struc-
tural differences in the interest rate pass-through across German banks. Weth related the
speed at which bank lending rates adjust to changes in market rates to a credit institution’s
size, its refinancing conditions and the extent of its business with non-banks. He concluded
that by smoothing their rates, banks appear to be accepting temporary fluctuations in their
loan mark-up, which, in turn, tend to retard monetary policy transmission via bank rates.
Examining the retail bank interest rate pass-through process in the euro area, de Bondt
(2002) showed that the immediate pass-through of market interest rates to retail bank interest
rates is incomplete, in line with previous cross country studies. The empirical results sug-
gested a quicker retail interest rate pass-through process since the introduction of the Euro.
Using an error correction model of the interest rate pass-through process based on a mar-
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ginal cost pricing framework including switching and asymmetric information costs, he esti-
mated that the proportion of a given market interest rate change that is passed-through
within one month to be around 50 per cent and close to 100 per cent in the long term.
Mizen and Hofmann (2002) provided a theoretical and econometric framework for as-
sessing the evidence of the assumption of complete pass-through using 14 years of monthly
data for interest rates on deposit and mortgage products offered by UK banks and building
societies. The method employed allows for asymmetries and non-linearities in adjustment
and the results show that the speed of adjustment in retail rates depends on whether the
perceived ‘gap’ between retail and base rates is widening or narrowing.
Research work conducted by Petro, McDermott and Tripe explored the relationship
between the New Zealand official cash rate (OCR), money market interest rates and financial
intermediaries’ lending margins. They looked at the difference in the degree of pass-through
before and after OCR implementation and the extent to which a change in money market rates
is passed-through to banks’ housing lending rates. They also observed that since the intro-
duction of OCR, there has been a significant decline in the volatility of both underlying
money market rates and margins.
Using Markov switching regime systems that allows for asymmetries and non-linearities
in the parameters, Humala (2003) modelled the dynamic relationship between money market
rate and different short term lending rates in the banking system of Argentina. He observed
that under normal financial conditions short-run stickiness is higher for those rates on loans
with higher credit risk.
Burgstaller (2003) examined dynamic responses of commercial credit rates to changes in
key policy rates and money market rates using Austrian data from 1995 to 2002. He showed
that the strength and speed of interest rate transmission depend on whether rates go up or
down. However, with the establishment of EMU this asymmetry in interest rate transmission
has partly declined and the speed of transmission and the relative importance of policy and
money market rates for commercial credit rates too have been affected.
With the objective of testing whether Chile’s pass-through is atypical Espinosa-Vega
and Rebucci (2003) investigated empirically the pass-through of money market interest rates
to retail banking interest rates in Chile, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and five
European countries.  They estimated both the size and the speed of the pass-through from
policy to retail banking rates, in the short-run (on impact, within a month) and in the long-run
(in the steady state) for Chile They compared the results with a number of other countries
and concluded that as in most countries considered in their study, Chile’s measured pass-
through is incomplete but does not appear atypical. They also found no significant evidence
of asymmetry in Chile’s pass-through across states of the interest rate or monetary policy
cycle.
Kleimeier and Sander (2003) used a generalized empirical approach that allows for a
variety of different specifications of the pass-through, including asymmetric adjustment, the
role of interest rate expectations, in determining retail banking product pricing in the Eurozone.
They showed that the pass-through is faster when monetary policy changes are correctly
anticipated. However, this result is limited to the loan market and more pronounced for
positive interest rate shocks, while particularly deposit rates are found to be rigid, suggest-
ing an important role of competitive banking markets for the pass-through process.
In 2004, Tieman aimed to test the hypothesis that the interest rate pass-through from
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Table 1 - Data and Techniques used
in Previous Research on the Interest Rate Pass-through Process
Researcher Data Description Analytical Tools Used
Hannan and Berger (1991)
Lowe and Rohling (1992)
Cottarelli and Kourelis
(1994)
Borio and Fritz (1995)
Moazzami (1999)
Winker (1999)
Mojon (2000)
Mahadeva and Thenuwara
(1999/2000)
Toolsema, Strum and de
Haan (2001)
Donnay and Degryse
(2001)
Heinemann and Schüler
(2001)
Bredin, Fitzpatrick, and O
Reilly (2002)
Berstein and Fuentes
Weth (2002)
De Bondt (2002)
Mizen and Hofmann
(2002)
Petro, McDermott and
Tripe
Humala (2003)
The United States of America
September 1983 -December 1986
Australia
January 1986- August 1991
31 Industrial and Developing
Countries (Including Sri Lanka)
January 1980- June 1993
12 OECD countries
Canada and the United States of
America
January 1969-December 1995
Federal Republic of  Germany
January 1975-October 1989
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain
1979-1998
Sri Lanka
Jan. 1990-December 1999
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain
January 1980-January 2000
12 European Countries
1980-2000
EU Member Countries
March 1995-October 2000
Ireland
January 1980-March 2001
Chile
1996-2002
Germany
April 1993-December 2000
EU Member Countries
January 1996-May 2001
The United Kingdom
January 1986-July 1999
New Zealand
August 1994-July 2001
Argentina
June 1993-December 2000
Multinomial Logit Estimation
Simple OLS Regression Analysis
Distributed Lag Analysis
Distributed Lag Analysis
Distributed Lag Analysis
Error Correction Analysis
Marginal Cost Pricing Model
Co-integration and Error Correction
Analysis
Error Correction Analysis
Co-integration and Error Correction
Analysis
General Method of Moments
Distributed Lag Analysis
Error Correction Analysis
Structural VAR Based on the Cholesky
Decomposition
Error Correction Analysis
Error Correction Analysis
Imperfect Competition Model
Quadratic Loss Function
Distributed Lag Analysis
Error Correction Analysis
Marginal Cost Pricing Model
Error Correction Analysis VAR
Distributed Lag Analysis
Co-integration and Error Correction
Analysis
Co-integration
Regime Change Tests
Co-integration and Error Correction
Analysis
Markov Switching  VAR
Linear VAR
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Burgstaller (2003)
Espinosa-Vega and
Rebucci (2003)
Kleimeier and
Sander (2003)
Tieman (2004)
Austria
March 1995-December 2002
Chile, the United States, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and Five
European Countries
April 1993-September 2002
Euro zone
January 1999-May 2003
Romania, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic
and Slovenia
January 1995-February 2004
Structural VAR
Distributed Lag Analysis
Error Correction Analysis
Co-integration
VAR
Threshold Autoregressive Model
Co-integration and Error Correction
Analysis
Table 1 (Contd.):
Researcher Data Description Analytical Tools Used
policy to market rates plays a lesser role in Romania than in other transition economies in the
region. Results for data series on newly issued loans suggest that market rates for new loans
react to policy rate changes quite fast and in most cases almost one-to-one, and confirmed
that transmission in Romania is similar to that of its neighbours. Analysis of the Romanian
loans market for different time periods strongly suggested that the interest rate pass-through
from policy to market rates has become more pronounced over time.
Having reviewed a selection of literature on the experience of interest rate pass-through
in different countries, it is now appropriate to explore existing findings on interest rate pass-
through in Sri Lanka.
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), in their analysis of interest rate pass-through in 31 coun-
tries, computed the 3 months, 6 months and long-run multipliers to be 0.22, 0.28, and 0.30,
respectively as against average 3 months, 6 months and long-run multipliers of 0.64, 0.77 and
0.97, indicating extremely slow and incomplete pass-through both in the short-run and long-
run in Sri Lanka.
To evaluate money market efficiency in Sri Lanka, Mahadeva and Thenuwara (1999/
2000) employed several econometric tests, particularly one that was based on the co-integra-
tion properties of market interest rates and monetary policy rates. They were of the view that
if markets are efficient the market rates and policy rates should be co-integrated implying that
market rates respond to policy rates. Results indicated that call money rates are not co-
integrated with any deposit rate, but the market rediscount rate is co-integrated with espe-
cially the shorter interest rates. Mahadeva and Thenuwara found that the pass-through
coefficients were much lower than one and lower than those of other countries, indicating
significant inefficiencies in the Sri Lankan money market “imposing serious drawbacks in the
propagation of policy changes to the final target variable”.
More recently, the International Monetary Fund (2004) quantified interest rate pass-
through in analysing monetary transmission mechanism in Sri Lanka. They concluded that
changes in policy rates appear to translate into changes in market-determined interest rates.
Using simple OLS regressions and Treasury bill rates with maturities of 3, 6 and 12 months,
they showed that changes are transmitted quickly throughout all maturities, with shorter
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maturity rates responding the fastest.
In concluding this chapter, data and models used in research work highlighted so far in
analysing the interest rate pass-through process are summarised in Table 1:
III. Data and Statistical/Econometric Tools Used
A. Description of Data
As indicated earlier, the objective of this paper is to analyse the interest rate pass-through
process in Sri Lanka and test the speed and magnitude of the pass-through. In order to do so,
several interest rate data series are used. However, there is no consistency between the
periodicity of data as well as the available time periods for each series.
Daily data are used to address whether there is a one-to-one pass-through from policy
interest rates to call money market rates or else, to assess at what rate a unit change in policy
rates impact upon the call money market rates in the short-run and in the long-run. Described
below are the daily interest rate data series used for this analysis. All interest rates are given
in percentages.
a) REPO – This is the CBSL policy interest rate which effectively regulates minimum
rate in the overnight call money market. A daily data series is available since the
introduction of the Repo facility on 04 October 1993. Up to 31 December 2004, the
REPO series has 2,935 daily observations.
b) REVREPO – Just as the Repo rate regulates the minimum overnight call money
market rate, the objective of introducing the Reverse Repo rate was to provide an
upper bound for the overnight call money market rate. However, its effectiveness in
doing so is limited by the availability of Government securities available with money
market participants. The Reverse Repo facility was introduced on 09 November
1998 and up to 31 December 2004, the series contains 1,605 observations.
c) REPOAUCWA – With the introduction of more active OMO commencing 03 March
2003, OMO participants play a major role in setting the effective rate at the daily
OMO auctions within the policy interest rate corridor. In view of excess liquidity in
the money market during the entire period following the introduction of more active
OMO, the CBSL has conducted only Repo auctions and no Reverse Repo auction.
Therefore, this series contains weighted average rate at OMO Repo auctions and
has 480 observations.
d) CALLWA – This is the weighted average Call Money Market rate. Although mini-
mum and maximum call money market rates are available for a longer time horizon,
CALLWA is available only from 02 December 1996. The series has 2,110 observa-
tions.
e) EFFECTIVERATE – The existence of several policy interest rates poses the serious
problem of what policy interest rate should be used to analyse interest rate pass-
through from policy rates to call money market rates. Although it was quite possible
to have used dummy variables to determine what policy interest rate is the effective
rate under each circumstance, an alternative, but arguably similar, method was used
to compile a new series of effective interest rates. This was done as follows:
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1) Daily excess liquidity estimates were used to determine whether the effective inter-
est rate for that particular day was the Repo rate or the Reverse Repo rate. When
there was excess liquidity the Repo rate was the effective rate, while when there was
no excess liquidity or liquidity shortage Reverse Repo rate was considered the
effective rate
2) For the period before the Reverse Repo facility was introduced, the Bank rate was
used to fill in the gaps, although this may not be a plausible alternative given that
the Bank rate was only an indicative rate since 1985.
3) Since the introduction of more active OMO on 03 March 2003, the weighted aver-
age Repo auction rate is taken as the effective rate.
The resultant daily data series was named EFFECTIVERATE.
Although daily data are used to analyse the interest rate pass-through from policy
interest rates to call money market rate, such short periodicities are not available to many
other interest rate variables. Therefore, to address whether there is a one-to-one pass-
through from call money market rates to commercial bank retail interest rates (lending rates /
deposit rates) or else, to examine at what rate a unit change in call money market rates impact
upon the commercial bank retail interest rates in the short-run and in the long-run, as well as
to assess whether there is an asymmetry of pass-through during different phases of an
interest rate cycle the following monthly interest rate series were used. Unless otherwise
specified, all series had 175 monthly observations commencing June 1990.
a) CALLWA – Monthly averages of daily weighted average call money market rate
comprised this series. However, since daily weighted average call money market
rates were available only from December 1996, this series had only 97 observations.
b) CALLMID – An attempt was made to elongate the data series on call money market
rates by using the middle of the minimum and maximum daily call money market
rates and then taking the monthly averages of these rates. The resultant series was
named CALLMID and it was observed that this series was almost perfectly corre-
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lated with CALLWA for the period they coincided. CALLMID was available from
October 1993 and contained 133 observations.
c) COMAWPR – Average Weighted Prime Lending Rate (AWPR) is compiled weekly
by the CBSL based on information provided by commercial banks regarding new
lending to their prime customers. These loans are granted by commercial banks
usually on a short term basis. Monthly averages of weekly AWPR are taken to form
this series.
d) COMLOANPROMID – This is the middle rate of commercial bank lending secured
by property mortgages. It could be assumed that this series mainly comprises
interest rates on long term loans such as housing loans.
e) COMLOANUNSMID – This is the middle rate of commercial bank lending on an
unsecured basis. High spread between minimum and maximum interest rates on
unsecured lending reported by commercial banks suggests that this includes not
only lending at prime rates but also high interest rates on credit facilities such as
temporary overdrafts.
f) COMAWDR – The CBSL compiles Average Weighted Deposit rates (AWDR) on a
monthly basis based on data provided by commercial banks on their existing stock
of interest bearing deposits.
g) COMAWFDR – Since December 1996, the CBSL has compiled a series named
Average Weighted Fixed deposit Rate (AWFDR) based on data provided by com-
mercial banks on their existing stock of all term deposits. This series has only 97
observations.
h) COMSAVMID – This is the middle rate offered on savings deposits of commercial
banks.
i) UP – This is the dummy variable defined as 1 when the CBSL policy interest rates
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increased during this period over the last period or when policy interest rates have
remained unchanged during this period after the last change to policy interest rates
was upward.
j) DOWN – This is the dummy variable defined as 1 when the CBSL policy interest
rates decreased during this period over the last period or when policy interest rates
have remained unchanged during this period after the last change to policy interest
rates was downward.
B. Description of Statistical/Econometric Tools Used
Several statistical methods and econometric tests were carried out to analyse the interest
rate pass-through process in Sri Lanka. These methods and circumstances which warrant
the use of such tests are explained below:
a) Descriptive statistics – Descriptive statistics of all time series used are obtained in
order to observe the nature of each series. This included mean, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum.
b) Correlation – Simple coefficients of correlation are used to derive to the extent of
which interest rate series are correlated. Although this may be a good first indicator
of the presence or the absence of interest rate pass-through, using contemporane-
ous series do not allow measuring any lag effects involved.
c) Unit root tests – All time series are subject to stationarity tests prior to using these
series in econometric analysis, in order to avoid spurious regressions. Unit root
tests are carried out to test whether the series are level stationary (I(0)) or first
difference  stationary (I(1)). If a series is found to be I(1) then first differences may
have to be used in analysing the relationships. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
tests are used to test for stationarity. Results of these tests were confirmed by
Phillips-Perron tests. Although more sophisticated econometric procedures to test
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for stationarity have been introduced, for instance, by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt
and Shin (KPSS) where the null hypothesis is stationarity, these latter methods
were not used in the present analysis.
d) Causality tests – Causality tests introduced by Granger could be used to identify
whether policy rates precede changes in money market rates or whether changes in
money market rates prompt policy rate changes. Unexpected direction of causality
may indicate serious deficiencies in the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
e) Distributed lag modelling – Distributed lag models are used to observe how the
effect of a shock to exogenous variable is reflected on the endogenous variable
over time. Two popular methods are the Koyck approach and the Almon approach.
Koyck distributed lag model assumes that the effect declines geometrically as the
lag lengthens, an assumption which may be too restrictive in some instances.
Therefore, the polynomial distributed lag (PDL) approach introduced by Almon is
used instead.
f) Co-integration – If two time series are found to be I(1), they may be tested for co-
integration. Regression analysis using co-integrated time series are said to produce
non-spurious results. Procedures suggested by Engel and Granger as well as
Johansen are used to test for the existence of co-integrating relationships.
g) Error correction analysis – Given a co-integrated relationship, error correction mod-
els are used to analyse the short-term dynamics around a possible long-term equi-
librium relationship between time series. Simple error correction models as sug-
gested by Engel and Granger are used for this purpose.
h) Hypothesis tests – Simple hypothesis tests are carried out to verify whether the
pass-through is asymmetric over an interest rate cycle, and between deposit rates
and lending rates. Wald coefficient tests are used to impose and test restrictions
under the null hypotheses.
IV. Analysis and Findings
In this chapter, the data described in the previous chanper are used to carry out the analysis
of the interest rate pass-through process in Sri Lanka by employing the statistical and
econometric methods explained earlier. The analysis is conducted in two stages. First, the
pass-through from the CBSL policy interest rates to the call money market rates will be
looked at. The pass-through process from call money market rates to commercial bank retail
lending and deposit rates will be dealt with thereafter.
A. From Policy Rates to Money Market Rate
In analysing the interest rate pass-through from policy interest rates to money market rates,
five daily data series have been used. Descriptive statistics of these series are given in
Table 2.
Descriptive statistics show some early indications that CALLWA has, on average, re-
mained between REPO and REVREPO, although with higher volatility. Lower mean and
standard deviation of REPOAUCWA are due to the fact that this series is shorter than other
series and only covers a low interest rate regime.
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics Daily Interest Rates
Series Period Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
REPO
REVREPO
REPOAUCWA
EFFECTIVERATE
CALLWA
10/04/1993-
12/31/2004
11/09/1998-
12/31/2004
03/03/2003-
12/31/2004
12/02/1996-
12/31/2004
12/02/1996-
12/31/2004
11.3296
13.3611
7.6274
11.3793
12.3833
2.9983
3.7346
0.6905
3.7929
4.0642
7.0000
8.5000
7.0100
7.0000
7.2500
20.0000
23.0000
9.3300
23.0000
29.5400
As explained earlier, for several years, the CBSL’s policy interest rates, i.e., the Repo rate
and the Reverse Repo rate   have been used as the key monetary policy variables, particu-
larly, influencing the behaviour of the call money market rate. Therefore, a good starting
point for this analysis is to test whether the CBSL has set the direction for the behaviour of
call money market rates or whether the CBSL has followed the behaviour of call money
market rates by changing policy interest rates after call money market rates are adjusted
automatically to suit changing economic and financial conditions. To test these competing
hypotheses, Granger causality tests were carried out.
    Causality tests showed that there is unidirectional causality from REPO to CALLWA and
also from REVREPO to CALLWA. There is no causality from CALLWA to either REPO or
REVREPO. These results clearly indicate that the Repo rate and the Reverse Repo rate have
provided direction to the behaviour of the overnight call money market rate.
Cross correlations are good indicators to measure the degree of pass-through between
contemporaneous data. The correlation matrix given below shows that CALLWA is closely
correlated with the CBSL policy rates as well as the EFFECTIVERATE series created by
combining REPO,REVREPO and REPOAUCWA and liquidity conditions in the money market.
Table 3:  Pair-wise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 12/02/1996 12/31/2004
Lags: 10
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  CALLWA does not Granger Cause REPO 2100  0.97864  0.45980
  REPO does not Granger Cause CALLWA 11.0459  0.00000
Sample: 11/09/1996 12/31/2004
Lags: 10
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  CALLWA does not Granger Cause REVREPO 1595  1.00337  0.43811
  REVREPO does not Granger Cause CALLWA 10.8346  0.00000
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Table 4 - Correlation Matrix for Daily Interest Rates
Maximum Sample:  12/02/1996-12/31/2004
REPO REVREPO EFFECTIVERATE CALLWA
REPO 1.0000 0.9608 0.9350 0.9034
REVREPO 0.9608 1.0000 0.9457 0.9488
EFFECTIVERATE 0.9350 0.9457 1.0000 0.9262
CALLWA 0.9034 0.9488 0.9262 1.0000
The final analysis of the interest rate pass-through from policy interest rates to money
market rates is expected to be conducted using the two series CALLWA and EFFECTIVERATE.
These series are then tested for stationarity in order to avoid spurious regressions. ADF
tests showed that both CALLWA and EFFECTIVERATE are stationary, i.e., I(0), while Phillips-
Perron tests confirmed this finding.
Table 5 - Unit Root Tests
Daily Interest Rates
Series No. of Lags Deterministic Components ADF Test Statistic
Constant Trend
EFFECTIVERATE (Level) 4 Significant Insignificant -3.6896*
CALLWA (Level) 4 Significant Insignificant -3.7236*
* Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 per cent level. The results were confirmed by Phillips-Perron tests,
which used longer truncation lag lengths.
In order to quantify the size and speed of interest rate pass-through from
EFFECTIVERATE to CALLWA, a polynomial distributed lag (PDL) model was fitted. Prelimi-
nary experiments with PDLs with long lags suggested that using only 10 lags is sufficient to
capture the pass-through process from EFFECTIVERATE to CALLWA. Also, the model
initially imposed no end constraints in order to allow the model itself to determine the shape
of the polynomial. A second degree polynomial distributed lag model was found to be
appropriate for the analysis. The estimated relationship could be written as:
CALLWAt = α + β1 PDL01t + β2 PDL02t + β3 PDL03t + εt
Where;
PDL01t = ∑
=
k
i 0
EFFECTIVERATEt-i
PDL02t = ∑
=
k
i 0
 iEFFECTIVERATEt-i
                                      PDL03t =              i2 EFFECTIVERATEt-i
where i is the length of the lag and k is the maximum length of the lag.
∑
=
k
i 0
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The results of the PDL model are given in Table 6:
Table 6 - Pass-through from Policy Rates to the Call Money Market Rate
Sample(adjusted): 12/02/1996 12/31/2004
Included observations: 2110 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Probability
    C  0.7315  0.0988  7.4027  0.0000
PDL01  0.0403  0.0101  3.9861  0.0001
PDL02 -0.0299  0.0024 -12.3909  0.0000
PDL03  0.0053 0.0010  5.2320  0.0000
Lag Distribution of i Coefficient Std. Error  t-Statistic
EFFECTIVERATE
.               *| 0  0.3219  0.0194  16.6054
.           *    | 1  0.2444  0.0114  21.3855
.        *       | 2  0.1776  0.0074  24.1604
.     *          | 3  0.1212  0.0078  15.6088
.   *            | 4  0.0755  0.0094  8.0204
. *              | 5  0.0403  0.0101  3.9861
.*               | 6  0.0156  0.0094  1.6588
*                | 7  0.0015  0.0078  0.1949
*                | 8 -0.0020  0.0074 -0.2755
.*               | 9  0.0050  0.0114  0.4361
.*               | 10  0.0226  0.0194  1.1634
                                                 Sum of Lags 1.0235  0.0082  124.0930
The constant term and all three PDLs in the PDL equation are significant confirming that
a second degree polynomial is an appropriate fit to model the relationship. The lag distribu-
tion of EFFECTIVERATE shows that EFFECTIVERATE is passed-through to CALLWA
significantly within the first seven time periods (0-6) following a change to the
EFFECTIVERATE. The sum of lags between i = 0 to 6 is 0.9965 indicating a 99.65 per cent
pass-through from policy interest rates of the CBSL to the CALLWA within the first seven
working days (including the day policy rates were changed). More than 50 per cent of the
change is transmitted to the call money market rate on the first two days and the effect builds
into the call money market rate over the next few days after an almost complete pass-through.
From this analysis, it can be concluded that the CBSL policy decisions are efficiently
transmitted to the short end of the money market within a matter of days. Also, there is a
complete pass-through from policy interest rates to the call money market rate. Therefore,
there is no need to differentiate between a short-run pass-through and a long-run pass-
through with regard to the interest rate transmission process from the CBSL policy interest
rates to the overnight call money market.
B. From Money Market Rates to Retail Bank Interest Rates
Having established that there is a highly efficient interest rate pass-through process
between the CBSL policy interest rates and the call money market rate, this section analyses
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the pass-through from the call money market rate to retail interest rates in the commercial
banking sector, both on lending as well as on deposits. Monthly series of two representative
rates from the call money market, three commercial bank lending rates and three commercial
bank deposit rates are used for the analysis and relevant descriptive statistics are given in
Table 7:
Table 7 - Descriptive Statistics
Monthly Interest Rates
Series Period Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
CALLWA 1996/12-2004/12 12.3798 3.9210 7.4800 24.6200
CALLMID 1993/10-2004/12 13.4928 4.7980 7.5100 34.5600
COMAWPR 1990/06-2004/12 16.2546 3.5063 8.9400 22.8600
COMLOANPROMID 1990/06-2004/12 20.1218 1.9010 15.0000 23.5000
COMLOANUNSMID 1990/06-2004/12 22.5847 2.4281 18.5000 26.2500
COMAWDR 1990/06-2004/12 10.7418 2.7012 4.8400 14.1600
COMAWFDR 1996/12-2004/12 10.9527 2.2776 6.8200 14.7000
COMSAVMID 1990/06-2004/12 7.9616 1.8024 4.5500 11.2500
On average, all commercial bank lending rates are above both call money market rates
confirming the existence of a mark-up, which is as high as 10 percentage points for unse-
cured lending (COMLOANUNSMID). On the other hand, deposit rates are lower than the
call money market rates. Taken together, these factors confirm the high interest rate spread
between lending and deposit rates that prevail in the Sri Lankan banking industry. Except for
prime lending (COMAWPR), standard deviations of all other commercial bank rates are low,
indicating that commercial banks, themselves, absorb a part of volatility in the money mar-
ket; an early sign of low degree of pass-through between money market interest rates and
retail interest rates.
Cross-correlations between monthly interest rate series resulted in some interesting
findings. First, it was seen that CALLWA and the middle of the maximum and minimum rates
of the call money market (CALLMID) were closely correlated showing that these series
could be used interchangeably in our analysis. CALLMID was a longer time series, and
could be used in this analysis as an excellent proxy for CALLWA. Second, COMAWPR also
has a very high degree of correlation with call money market rates, while COAWDR and
COMAWFDR also show high correlations with call market rates. Third, the lowest correla-
tion with call market rates is with loans secures by immovable property (COMLOANPROMID),
which are of a long-term nature. Finally, it could also be seen that all three deposit rates are
closely correlated with each other.
Prior to engaging in performing econometric analyses, all variables were subjected to
ADF Unit root tests to verify their time series properties. The results are given in Table 9.
None of the monthly interest rate series was found to be stationary on levels. Therefore,
unit root tests were carried out on first differences. As indicated below, all first difference
series were stationary at a very high level of significance, and both the constant and the
trend were not significant in each series in carrying out unit root tests. It was concluded all
series were I(1).
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA 23
INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH IN SRI LANKA
Table 8 - Correlation Matrix for Monthly Interest Rates
Maximum Sample: June 1996-December 2004
CALL CALL COM COM COM COM COM COM
WA MID AWPR LOAN LOAN AWDR AWFDR SAVMID
PROMID UNSMID
CALLWA 1.0000 0.9994 0.9619 0.2801 0.3710 0.6360 0.7033 0.3900
CALLMID 0.9994 1.0000 0.7898 0.3644 0.4651 0.5371 0.7040 0.4307
COMAWPR 0.9619 0.7898 1.0000 0.3655 0.6888 0.8826 0.8131 0.7432
COMLOANPROMID 0.2801 0.3644 0.3655 1.0000 0.6531 0.4759 0.7159 0.4577
COMLOANUNSMID 0.3710 0.4651 0.6888 0.6531 1.0000 0.8282 0.8258 0.8368
COMAWDR 0.6360 0.5371 0.8826 0.4759 0.8282 1.0000 0.9726 0.9014
COMAWFDR 0.7033 0.7040 0.8131 0.7159 0.8258 0.9726 1.0000 0.8462
COMSAVMID 0.3900 0.4307 0.7432 0.4577 0.8368 0.9014 0.8462 1.0000
Table 9 - Unit Root Tests (Levels)
Monthly Interest Rates
Series Lags        Deterministic Components ADF Test
Constant Trend Statistic
CALLWA 2 Insignificant Insignificant -0.9216
CALLMID 4 Significant Insignificant -2.7525
COMAWPR 4 Significant Significant -2.9961
COMLOANPROMID 4 Insignificant Insignificant -1.0903
COMLOANUNSMID 4 Significant Significant -2.3928
COMAWDR 4 Significant Significant -2.9544
COMAWFDR 2 Insignificant Insignificant -1.2103
COMSAVMID 4 Significant Significant -2.9768
* Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 per cent level.
** Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 5 per cent level.
Table 10 - Unit Root Tests (First Differences)
Monthly Interest Rates
Series Lags       Deterministic Components ADF Test Statistic
Constant Trend
CALLWA 2 Insignificant Insignificant -5.1555*
CALLMID 4 Insignificant Insignificant -6.0604*
COMAWPR 4 Insignificant Insignificant -5.5559*
COMLOANPROMID 4 Insignificant Insignificant -6.8993*
COMLOANUNSMID 4 Insignificant Insignificant -6.5740*
COMAWDR 4 Insignificant Insignificant -3.0380*
COMAWFDR 2 Insignificant Insignificant -2.8441*
COMSAVMID 4 Insignificant Insignificant -5.0772*
* Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 per cent level.
** Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 5 per cent level.
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Given that monthly interest rates were I(1), a series of simple linear regressions were
carried out on first differences to assess the size and the significance of the interest rate
pass-through from call money market rate to retail bank rates. The simple model used is as
follows:
                                           ∆ Retail Ratet = α + εβ1 ∆ CALLWAt + εt
Where ∆ is the first difference operator.
Results of these regressions are summarized in Table 11.
Table 11 - Simple Linear Regressions
                        No Lag                  Sum of Coefficients(H0: εβ1=1)
α β1                               Number of lags
3 6 9
Lending Rates
COMAWPR 0.5132 0.7663 0.8057 0.7297
(0.0329) (0.000036) 0.006191) (0.000696)
COMLOANPROMID -0.1031 -0.1085 -0.0087 0.0649
( 0.0633) (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000007)
COMLOANUNSMID -0.1691 0.0214 0.0563 0.1980
(0.0533) (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000001)
Deposit Rates
COMAWDR -0.0703 0.0289 0.1324 0.1929 0.2595
(0.0205) (0.0147) (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000)
COMAWFDR -0.0646 0.0525 0.2020 0.2794 0.3753
(0.0272) (0.0194) (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000)
COMSAVMID -0.0339 0.0140 0.0607 0.2342 0.2386
(0.0390) (0.0279) (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000)
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates for α and β1, while probability values for
H0: εβ1=1 are given in parentheses below the sum of lagged coefficients.
Regression results showed that with regard to lending rates, the degree of interest rate
pass-through from call market rates was quite high for prime lending rates (COMAWPR).
While 50 per cent of a percentage change in call money market rates is felt on AWPR
immediately, the accumulated pass-through increases continuously until around 6 months
after a change. However, in the case of loans secured by property, the coefficients do not
even have the expected sign until after a lag of 9 months. Even at 9 months, sum of coeffi-
cients stands at 0.06 indicating that interest rates on long term loans are extremely rigid and
the level of pass-through is very low. Interest rates on unsecured loans are also quite rigid
and after a lag of 10 months, only 20 per cent of a percentage change in call money rates is
reflected in the changes in rates on unsecured loans. In the case of deposit rates, the degree
of pass-through is quite low initially, but increases within 9 months to around 20-40 per cent
of the change. The tests carried out to test the hypothesis that εβ1= 1, show that the degree
of pass-through is incomplete in all cases even after a lag of 9 months.
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Given that all interest rate series used in this analysis are I(1), it is appropriate to test
whether the linear relationships between these variables are co-integrated. This is done
using the methodology suggested by Engel and Granger. The test involves running regres-
sions of the type,
Retail Ratet = α + β CALLMIDt + εt
to obtain the co-integrating vectors
εt = (Retail Ratet - α - β CALLMIDt)
and use the ADF test on the residual series εt. However, since estimated β1 are based on the
estimated co-integrating parameter â, using the ADF critical significance values to test whether
the residual series are stationary is not appropriate. Instead, critical values computed by
Engel and Granger are used, and therefore, the appropriate test is known as the Augmented
Engel-Granger (AEG) test. Results of the regressions and relevant AEG test statistics are
shown in Table 12.
Table 12 - Testing for Co-integration
Results of Engel-Granger Tests
α β AEG Test Statistic
Lending Rates
COMAWPR 7.6290 0.5715 -2.9677*
(0.5508) (0.0385)
COMLOANPROMID 18.2985 0.1543 -2.9355*
(0.4894) (0.0342)
COMLOANUNSMID 18.8307 0.2551 -3.3021*
(0.6026) (0.0421)
Deposit Rates
COMAWDR 6.1152 0.2803 -3.3292*
(0.5465) (0.0382)
COMAWFDR 5.8334 0.4122 -1.6235***
(0.5549) (0.0426)
COMSAVMID 5.3967 0.1517 -2.3237**
(0.3945) (0.0276)
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
* Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 per cent level.
** Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 5 per cent level.
***Hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 10 per cent level.
The results show that all relationships are co-integrated (although at different levels of
significance). These regressions are said to represent the long-run relationships and the
estimated β represent the long-run pass-through from CALLMID to commercial bank retail
rates. Accordingly the long-run pass-through from call money market rates to prime lending
rates is about 57 per cent, while rates on long term loans secured by property
(COMLOANPROMID) and interest rates on savings deposits (COMSAVMID), show the
lowest levels of long-run pass-through.
The existence of co-integrated relationships between call money market rates and retail
interest rates is confirmed by the results of the Johansen’s co-integration tests shown in
Table 13.
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Table 13 - Results of the Johansen’s Co-integration Tests
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
Series: COMAWPR CALLMID
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
 0.166867  26.19938  15.41  20.04       None **
 0.014323  1.918713   3.76   6.65    At most 1
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
Series: COMLOANPROMID CALLMID
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
 0.113690  17.56604  15.41  20.04       None *
 0.011322  1.514449   3.76   6.65    At most 1
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
Series: COMLOANUNSMID CALLMID
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
 0.160955  25.83521  15.41  20.04       None **
 0.018584  2.494929   3.76   6.65    At most 1
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
Series: COMAWDR CALLMID
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
 0.230690  35.26773  15.41  20.04       None **
 0.002906  0.387019   3.76   6.65    At most 1
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
Series: COMAWFDR CALLMID
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
 0.275670  33.69420  15.41  20.04       None **
 0.031655  3.055895   3.76   6.65    At most 1
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
Series: COMSAVMID CALLMID
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
 0.191156  30.91426  15.41  20.04       None **
 0.020084  2.698419   3.76   6.65    At most 1
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
 L.R. test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
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Having shown that there are long-run equilibrium relationships between each set of
variables, i.e., the relationships are co-integrated, the next step is to analyse the short-run
behaviour of the variables using the error correction mechanism (ECM) suggested by Engel
and Granger. ECM is where the short-run disequilibria shown by the error terms (also known
as equilibrium errors) obtained from Engel-Granger tests for co-integration are used to tie the
short-run behaviour of dependent variables to their long-run values. The following ECM
equation is used to continue the analysis.
∆ (Retail Ratet) = α + β1 ∆ (CALLMIDt) + β2 εt-1 +ut
where ∆ is the first difference operator, ut is the  random  error  term  and εt-1 =  Retail
Ratet-1 - α - β CALLMIDt-1 (i.e., the one period lagged value of the error from the co-
integrating regressions derived above). ECM equations state that changes in retail rates
depend on the changes in CALLMID as well as on the equilibrium error terms. If the error
term is zero, the model is in equilibrium.
Table 14 - Error Correction Mechanism  (ECM) Regressions
α β1 β2 AdjR2
Lending Rates
COMAWPR 0.1775 -0.0914 0.3558
(0.0208) (0.0266) 0.3558
COMLOANPROMID -0.0173 -0.0768 0.0281
(0.0239) (0.0350) 0.0281
COMLOANUNSMID -0.0123 -0.0778 0.0544
(0.0226) (0.0263) 0.0544
Deposit Rates
COMAWDR -0.0623 0.0090 -0.0212 0.0525
(0.0157) (0.0059) (0.0076)
COMAWFDR -0.0635 0.0463 -0.0799 0.2765
(0.0239) (0.0173) (0.0149)
COMSAVMID 0.0056 -0.0563 0.0466
(0.0104) (0.0184)
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
Estimated coefficients β1 could be interpreted as short-run adjustments. Similar to the
findings earlier in this section, the ECM equations also suggest a sluggish pass-through
from call money market rates to commercial bank retail interest rates. Rates on loans to prime
customers show the highest short-run pass-through of 0.18 per cent, while various deposit
rates show very slow adjustments. Also, low R2 values suggest that several other factors
affect the interest rate pass-through process.
Some researchers have found that in certain countries when policy interest rates are
rising, retail lending rates respond quickly but deposit rates remain sluggish, while the
opposite is true when policy interest rates are declining. Similar test using Sri Lankan data
were carried out to check whether this is true for Sri Lanka as well. The model used is:
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∆ Retail Ratet = α + β1 ∆ UP + β2 ∆ DOWN + εt
where ∆ is the first difference operator, UP is a dummy variable (1 when the Policy
interest Rate increases) multiplied by CALLWA, and DOWN is a dummy variable (1 when
the policy rate decreases) multiplied by CALLWA (See data description in Chapter 3).  The
results from these regressions are provided in Table 15.
Table 15 - Tests of Symmetrical Responses
α β1 β2 Sig. LevelH0: â1=â2
Lending Rates
COMAWPR 0.5074 0.5165 0.4097
(0.0337) (0.0332)
COMLOANPROMID -0.0940 -0.1083 0.5012
(0.0649) (0.0639)
COMLOANUNSMID -0.1853 -0.1598 0.1528
(0.0542) (0.0534)
Deposit Rates
COMAWDR -0.0701 0.0278 0.0295 0.7246
(0.0206) (0.0151) (0.0149)
COMAWFDR -0.0640 0.0498 0.0541 0.5091
(0.0273) (0.0199) (0.0196)
COMSAVMID 0.0104 0.0183 0.3985
(0.0284) (0.0280)
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
The results show that estimated values for β1 are marginally lower than β2, suggesting
that interest rates are more flexible downward. Lowe and Rohling, who tested for asymmetry
of pass-through using Australian data also found a similar relationship. However, in none of
the cases, the hypothesis that retail interest rates respond symmetrically could be rejected.
Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no evidence that in Sri Lanka, commercial bank
retail interest rates respond asymmetrically during different phases of the interest rate cycle.
In summary, it can be concluded that the pass-through from call money market rates to
both lending rates as well as deposit interest rates of commercial banks are sluggish and
incomplete. The only exception is perhaps the rates on lending to prime customers, which
show a faster and closer pass-through. However, it must be noted that COMAWDR and
COMAWFDR are stock variables, while COMAWPR is a flow variable, which, by definition,
captures adjustments in the money market rates faster. Also, there is no evidence to con-
clude that commercial bank retail interest rates react differently to increases and decreases of
money market interest rates.
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V. Conclusion
Findings in section IV indicate that although there is a rapid and almost complete pass-
through from the Central Bank policy interest rates to call money market rates, the pass-
through from call money market rates to commercial bank retail interest rates is sluggish and
incomplete. The sluggish and incomplete pass-through poses a challenge to the Central
Bank as it hinders the achievement of its monetary policy objectives as desired.
Studies have suggested several possible reasons for sluggish adjustments in commer-
cial bank retail interest rates. These include the lack of competition in the financial system,
collusive behaviour of banks, adverse selection and moral hazard problems, menu costs of
commercial banks, switching costs to customers, inelasticity of demand for bank services,
risk sharing behaviour, consumer irrationality, and the high proportion of fixed-rate loans
and deposits. These reasons are possibly inter-related and also could be competing. This
aspect, however, is beyond the scope of the present study, but contains future research
opportunities for testing the validity of each of these arguments in the Sri Lankan context.
Potential research related to the present study includes analysing the term structure of
interest rates and broadening the study to cover the developments in the Treasury bill and
Treasury bond markets. An in-depth study into modelling the monetary transmission mecha-
nism in Sri Lanka analysing each of the relevant transmission channels is yet to be under-
taken.
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